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The Taft-Hartley Act-Punishment or Progress
By JAFs R. RICHARDSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is the writer's rather firm conviction that the Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947,1 hereinafter referred to by its un-
popular name, the Taft-Hartley Act, is a constructive, progressive
and comprehensive approach to equitable labor-management re-
lations, rather than a living example of vengeful legislation as its
opponents would have us believe.
With this premise flatly stated it necessarily becomes the pur-
pose of this article to attempt to justify such by examining the
labor picture prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, and
then to seek, through reference to decisions of the courts, National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rulings, and the Act itself, the
material changes in labor-management relations effected by the
Act.
Much has been said about the Taft-Hartley Act. Much has
been written and will be written about this embattled Act, which
has to date fully withstood the onslaughts of organized labor in
both Democratic and Republican dominated Houses of Congress.
It is a fair assumption to state that all indications are to the effect
that in the main it will continue to withstand attacks from all
sources. The American Federation of Labor and the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, having failed in a joint attempt to defeat
Senator Robert Taft in the Ohio senatorial election and seeing
their espoused candidate lose in the past presidential election,
now speak of amendment rather than outright repeal. President
Eisenhower stated during his campaign, in an address directed to
the attention of labor, that it was important that we continue in
law the encouragement of collective bargaining; the right to
strike; an advance notice before a strike is called; a requirement
* A.B. 1930, Eastern Teachers College; LL.B. 1935, University of Kentucky;
1944-48, Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky; Associate Professor of Law,
University of Florida; member of Kentucky and Florida bars and American Bar
Association.161 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. secs. 151 et seq. (Supp. 1951).
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that both unions and employees remain true to their contracts;
and the assurance that members of unions get a regular report on
their organization's finances. Examination of this pronouncement
coupled with the make-up of the present Congress will lead one
to the conclusion that the Taft-Hartley Act will undergo no more
than amendment in the foreseeable future, with fundamental pro-
visions remaining intact.
As to amendments to the Act it was inescapable that such a
far reaching piece of legislation would develop "bugs" in applica-
tion that would require ironing out through necessary legislative
action. We will have more to say with respect to possible changes
in the Act later.
The writer, in commenting on the Taft-Hartley Act, is chiefly
motivated by the conviction expressed above as to the soundness
of the Act and the further belief that the Act receives its most
forceful attacks from self-serving interests, from those who act-
ually receive benefit from it, and from those who are not informed
on the subject. In the self-serving category we may place labor
leaders who refuse to accept the fact that the pendulum was
bound to swing back in time, and those who make political capital
of a subject that has great collective vote-getting appeal. This be-
lief, is not without basis in fact and can be substantiated by cer-
tain statistical data. In the summer of 1948 a magazine with large
national circulation published the results of a poll of labor itself
on the Taft-Hartley Act.2 The result, if not startling, may at least
incidentally reveal that we Americans, in the exercise of our pre-
rogatives, will express an opinion on anything from such a prosaic
subject as the weather to nuclear fission with only the slightest of
encouragement. So the writer ventures to state that a majority of
those who condemn the Act could not name an instance in which
it amends the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, hereinafter
referred to by its popular name, the Wagner Act.3 Let this state-
ment be taken, not as criticism of lack of knowledge of a highly
technical piece of legislation, but rather, as an indication of how
well-directed and oft-repeated propaganda can mold public opin-
'Robinson, A Second Look at the Taft-Hartley Law, Look, June 8, 1948, p.
104.
'49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. Sees. 151 et seq. (1946).
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ion and thus influence, if not control, social legislation as well as
that in other fields.
The poll of labor referred to above, conducted by the opinion
Research Foundation, revealed that of all the employee-class
polled only 32% approved passage of the Taft-Hartley Act as
such while at the same time they approved its ten major features
in percentages ranging from 51% to 86%. Briefly, 69% approved
prohibition against job discrimination by unions; 78% approved
the 60 day cooling off period before strikes are called; 79% ap-
proved the provision for the union shop; 86% favored union
financial reports being made available to union members; 76%
favored the anti-communist oath by union officials; 76% favored
unions liability to management for breach of contract; 68 % favored
the prohibition as to compulsory check-off of union dues and fees;
56% favored prohibition as to contributions to union political
fund; and 78% favored the national emergency provision for vote
on 'last offer" after 80-day period prior to a strike being called.
Consider the results of this poll. What are its implications?
What does it demonstrate to you? Organized labor is the avowed
enemy of the Act and has, through political action, made the Act
its chief target. The poll shows quite emphatically that the labor-
ing man favors the actual provisions of the Act when disassociated
from it, but opposes the Act by name. This disapproval we con-
clude is due to repeated propaganda barrages by the unions,
which have convinced their members that the Act is bad medicine.
We will not pass judgment on the motives of the union officials,
but rather leave it to the reader to decide whether this condemna-
tion is sincere.
It is significant that those most directly concerned, the workers
themselves, favor the Act in principle while labor union officials,
and even a former President of the United States, freely use the
rabble-rousing phrase, "Slave Labor Act", while invariably not
citing one specific instance wherein labor is unduly prejudiced by
the Act.
Further, it is much to be doubted that the average rank and
file labor union member can distinguish between the closed shop
and the union shop. Yet opinions are freely passed on the Taft-
Hartley Act which bans the closed shop and recognizes the union
shop-a democratic institution approved by labor individually.
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It is quite within reason that those who are either anti-labor
or anti-capital will remain adamant in the face of argument in
favor of the Taft-Hartley Act. Yet, it is believed that those who
may be classified with the great majority, as pro both elements,
will find the Act acceptable. The Act is the culmination of
months of painstaking work and research, of committee reports
and hearings and of Congressional debate in an attempt to equate
the rights of labor and management and reconcile that which
might well be termed the irreconcilable. It is a highly intricate
form of legislative drafting and is a tribute to the efforts of its
authors, though study and analysis of it may well result in spots
before the eyes at times.4
From a slightly facetious deviation let us return to a further
serious conviction of the writer that in order to preserve private
enterprise and free labor, the Taft-Hartley Act, or its substantial
equivalent, must not only remain on the statute books, but must
be accepted in a spirit of give and take by the parties in interest
lest we drift further down the road to the left on the wings of
some "ism", be it socialism or statism, which is the dole in dis-
guise-the concomitant of national decay.
Perhaps the writer, by the foregoing introductory remarks, has
fully convinced the reader of a biased mind. Possibly such is the
case, and our purpose is to dissipate old prejudices and create new
ones. If such can be done by no misstatement of facts it is a
legitimate objective, for Chief Justice Holmes once remarked to
the effect that any man who claimed he was unbiased on any
particular subject was either a prevaricator or uninformed there-
on. The desirable bias is one equally favoring capital and labor,
with the day to become only a memory when members of Con-
gress are labeled "friends" or "enemies" of labor.
For purposes of continuity and as a stage setting, it will serve
at least incidentally the main objective of this writing to consider
briefly the history of the so-called labor movement in America.
Labor's early struggle to achieve even the bare right to organ-
ize in order to bargain on a basis of equality in regard to wages
" "Judge Learned Hand once wrote thusly in regard to the income tax law:
"The words of such an act as the Income Tax merely dance before my eyes in a
meaningless procession" (a pity the aptly named judge apparently permitted such
an act to influence some of his opinions to so affect the writer). Davidson, Judge
Learned Hand: Titan of the Law, Coronet, Sept. 1949, p. 111.
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and hours is a familiar story, and forms a sordid part of the history
of our otherwise magnificent industrial growth. Managements
answer to labor's most effective pressure device, the strike, be-
came known as "government by injunction" and this phase of our
economic history is equally familiar to those interested in the
field of labor relations.
Organized labor's long and determined struggle to reach a
position from which it could wage an unhampered two-fisted
fight with management was inevitably to be crowned with suc-
cess under a democratic form of government and it rapidly be-
came a reality with the philosophy of the New Deal Administra-
tion of 1932 and a Supreme Court which became amenable
thereto.
Looking backward for a moment, let us recall that in 1917 the
Supreme Court had held that a court of equity might properly
cause an injunction to issue restraining attempts to organize em-
ployees bound by contract with their employer not to join a labor
union.' This "yellow-dog contract" became widely used by em-
ployers and, under continued legal sanction, would have been the
death knell of organized labor. Unions found it increasingly dif-
ficult to maintain hard won gains and practically impossible to
organize new areas or new industries. Organizational efforts in
the face of company enforced "yellow-dog contracts" resulted in
blood, violence and defeat, whereby union leaders very rightly
became convinced that new legislation was necessary if their de-
velopment was not to be frustrated and their very existence was
not to be threatened.6
Union leaders made insistent demands in both the fields of
substantive and procedural law. Specifically, they desired a
greatly restricted use of the injunction in labor disputes; outlaw-
ing of the "yellow-dog" contract; widening of the bounds of legiti-
mate labor purposes to permit strikes and picketing in the absence
of employer-employee relationship; abolition of judicially applied
tests of what constituted restraint of trade; abatement of the com-
mon law conspiracy as applied to union activity; and nonliability
of unions for unauthorized acts of violence by individuals.7
' Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
'Teller, Government by Injunction, 1 LABoR L. J. 41 (1949).
'See WITTE, Tm GoVy 'imNT w LABOR DisprrEs 277 (1932).
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The use, or more properly misuse, of the injunction, whereby
in an ex parte proceeding a temporary restraining order frequently
issued with its sole basis being a petition backed by specious af-
fidavits of representatives of private investigative agencies was
most bitterly fought by the unions. Though the order might ulti-
mately be dissolved on hearing to make permanent, more often
than not management's objective was obtained by the long drawn-
out court proceedings resulting in the strike being effectively
broken up before final order was entered on the extended hearing.
Final and almost complete victory over the labor injunction
was achieved when the Norris-LaGuardia Act became law in
1932.8 The purpose of this so-called anti-injunction statute was
to prevent the federal courts from issuing injunctions against
union activities occurring within the context of "labor disputes"
which (reference to the Act will show) are not limited to the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.9 Through pass-
age of this Act labor apparently achieved its full program, in-
cluding a provision in Section 8(a) of the Act which declared
the "yellow-dog" contract to be against public policy and unen-
forcible. The Act did not fully outlaw the labor injunction, but
it did so for all practical purposes, for now the shoe was on the
other foot and the injunction could issue only after a full hearing,
with a showing of irreparable damages, and that local law en-
forcement agencies could not or would not give protection. Many
states thereafter passed their own "little Norris-LaGuardia Acts."
To demonstrate further labor's triumph through friendly legis-
lation we see the federal judiciary broadly interpreting the Act
and denying itself the right to inquire into the background of
labor activity so long as a "labor dispute" was found to exist, re-
fusing to inquire as to the purpose of a strike,'0 holding that
picketing in the absence of a strike is legal" and that secondary
boycotts are legal and unenjoinable. 12
Despite these extraordinary and positive gains by the unions,
their leaders soon found that employers could still hamper their
847 STAT. 70, 29 U.S.C. 101 (1932).
'New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery, 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
" Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F. 2d 948 (3d Cir. 1938).
' Lauf v. Shinner, 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
"Milk Wagon Driver's Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prod. Inc., 311 U.S. 91
(1940).
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organizational efforts through such means as discharge of union
agitators and the refusal to bargain collectively.'3 The unions
turned again to the government for assistance, this time seeking
affirmative relief in their efforts to organize labor. The answer to
their demands and pleas came in the form of the Wagner Act,
above mentioned, which was the first attempt at a labor relations
act which had as its purpose the promotion of collective bargain-
ing. In this respect, as in others, the Act was strictly unilateral in
spirit and substance as the burden of bargaining collectively in
good faith was not placed on the unions. Whereas the anti-trust
and anti-injunction statutes provided a negative type of relief,
such an act as the Wagner Act affirmatively declares that the em-
ployer cannot interfere with employee organizational activity and
that employers are under a legal duty to bargain collectively with
labor representatives. As in the case of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
the Wagner Act soon found its counterpart enacted in many states
seeking to get on labor's booming band wagon.
The Wagner Act was actively enforced through an administra-
tive agency, the National Labor Relations Board, created by the
Act itself. Cease and desist orders issued almost indiscriminately
from this Board requiring abstinence from interference with any
and all union activity, including numerous orders for reinstate-
ment of employees with back pay and many orders requiring em-
ployers to bargain collectively. This eager activity of the NLRB
in the early years of its inception can perhaps be excused or ex-
plained by the "growing pains" or "new broom" theory and th6
necessity for settling down onto an even keel, which usually fol-
lows in time in a well ordered society. As a result of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, the Wagner Act, and liberal interpretation and
application thereof by the courts, the labor movement received
prodigious impetus, with union membership increasing from
about three million persons in the early thirties to sixteen million
in the late forties.' 4 These figures standing alone show that unions
are bound to exert a powerful force in our political and social
economy and such is a healthy situation if the organizations know
their own strength and realize their obligations to the general
public.
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
CCH, A GumEnooEK TO LABO RELATiONS LAw 10 (1950).
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The 16,000,000 union members may on the face of it seem
relatively small when it is pointed out that as of May, 1950, the
Bureau of Census of the U. S. Department of Commerce estimated
the civilian labor force at nearly 63,000,000. Of this number, ap-
proximately 43,000,000 were wage and salaried workers, who con-
stitute the potential union area. Union membership, then, ac-
counts for about 38% of the regular wage and salary earners.
This percentage is not impressive until one considers the number
of non-organized workers presently considered not easily organ-
ized by the unions' own standards. This includes over 8,000,000
agricultural workers, plus domestic help and the middle-class
white collar workers.
On the other hand, and to the credit side for the unions is
the fact that labor is 80 to 100 percent unionized in transporta-
tion, coal and metal mining, the steel industry, automobile and
aircraft, clothing and shoe industries, shipbuilding, construction,'
rubber products, telegraph, newspapers and communications, and
motion pictures. 15
From 1935 till the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947
our national labor policy can be likened to a man attempting to
hold to a straight course in a rowboat with only one oar in an
oarlock. As Mr. Teller has commented in his excellent article
heretofore referred to, ".... singlemindedness, though it may often
be a virtue among individuals, is rarely a mark of wisdom in legis-
lation."16 For the period of years just mentioned we were, most
unfortunately and inequitably, totally without a bilateral policy
to govern labor and management in their inseparably close rela-
tions. Management became the "whipping boy" on which labor
could vent its anger for wrongs of the past, real and fancied.
To illustrate: no order could be entered by the NLRB against
labor unions under any authorization of the Wagner Act, because
that Act directed itself mainly to employer violations or wrong-
doing. And, in general, no mandate against unions could be issued
under any federal law, because the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as in-
terpreted, had pretty thoroughly withdrawn union activity from
the purview of the courts." Further in point, be it noted that
P-H, Tii HousE. oF LABoR 60-63 (1951).
Teller, Government by Injunction, 1 LABOR L. J. 40, 43 (1949).
"United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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while, as we have mentioned, the Act required only the employer
to bargain collectively with the employees' duly designated bar-
gaining agent, 8 it failed to protect the employer from a union
claim of unfair labor practice when a third party boycotted the
employer to thereby upset the bargaining agreement.' Nor was
a remedy available when a union boycotted an employer because
he assigned work to members of another union. Featherbedding,
jurisdictional strikes and secondary boycotts were rife and were
not the subject of legal intervention.20 Union officials were indeed
unhobbled, and firmly seated in the saddle with sharp spurs.
As indicative of the trend and, as further indication of the
need for corrective legislation, let us examine a few leading cases
more closely. The landmark case of Thornhill v. Alabama2' estab-
lished the doctrine that peaceful picketing is protected activity
under constitutional guarantees of free speech. That peaceful
picketing is a legitimate, protected activity is not novel, but that
picketing is a form of speech may well be. However, those who
accept the doctrine as sound should find difficulty in rationalizing
the refusal of courts, prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, to concede
employers the right to advise their employees on labor-manage-
ment problems under this same constitutional guarantee of free
speech.2 2 Disregarding the one-sided application of the Constitu-
tion, it seems beyond argument that picketing constitutes an overt
act, is not pure speech and that the doctrine of the Thornhill case
came about as a matter of expediency in overriding a state statute.
In NLRB v. Star Publishing Company= the company as a re-
sult of pressure from the Teamster's Union, which halted delivery
of all newspapers, discharged its circulation department em-
ployees who were members of a rival union. Despite the fact that
the company was squarely in the middle of a jurisdictional strike
it lost either way it turned, for the desperation move to save its
'Elbe File & Binding Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 906 (1937).
"United States v. Building & Construction Trades Council, 313 U.S. 539
(1941).
United States v. Musicians Union, 318 U.S. 741 (1942).
310 U.S. 88 (1940). See, however, Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S.
460 (1950), wherein the view is adopted that industrial picketing involves patrol
of a particular locality and is more than mere speech, as the presence alone of a
picket may induce action of one kind or other irrespective of ideas being dis-
seminated.
NLRB v. Jones Foundry, 123 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1941).
=97 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1938).
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business resulted in a finding of guilty of an unfair labor practice.
A legislative solution, which the court suggested the company
should seek, has been provided by the Taft-Hartley Act.
Only a year prior to the above cited decision the New York
Court of Appeals reached a somewhat unusual and interesting re-
sult in a case that purportedly involved a labor dispute.24 In this
much discussed case the court held that the union's activity in
picketing a product in a retailer's store was unenjoinable, and this
where the dispute was with the manufacturer only. The court
did not bother to go into the fine points of how a few cans of
processed meat on the shelves of a general retail outlet could be
picketed without picketing the entire stock in trade. How the
picketing could be carried on without picketing the dealer, with
whom no original dispute existed, defies explanation. Those ex-
perienced in the effectiveness of picket lines will never believe
that all customers will cross a picket line to purchase unpicketed
products. The court tried to distinguish this case from its prior
holding that a sole proprietor could not be picketed to force him
to employ union labor.25 Such secondary activity was widely
countenanced on a much broader scale in the Wagner Act era.
In Senn v. Tile Layer's Union 6 the Supreme Court refused to
enjoin picketing which was instituted to force Senn to quit work-
ing on his own small contracting jobs with two or three journey-
men tile layers whom he employed. The complainant's factual
contention that he was ineligible for union membership; that he
would be driven out of business if not permitted to work un-
molested on his own job; and that an adverse ruling would in
effect deprive him of the right to work with his own hands fell on
unsympathetic ears. It is easy to imagine what this outraged
citizen thought of the brand of justice dealt him by a court of
justice.
In discussing two very significant labor cases of the Wagner
era, it is necessary to refer to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,27 the
Clayton Act28 and early leading decisions thereunder. In the
celebrated Danbury Hatters case29 the union instituted an effec-
' Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937).
'Thompson v. Bockhout, 273 N.Y. 390, 7 N.E. 2d 674 (1937).
"301 U.S. 468 (1937).
"26 STAT. 209 (1890).
"38 STAT. 730 (1914).
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
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tive nationwide secondary boycott, and, in this first labor case
under the Sherman Act, the Court found that this interference
with interstate trade was an unlawful combination in restraint of
trade. Such decisions led to passage of the Clayton Act in 1914.
In addition to limiting the use of injunctions by this Act, Con-
gress apparently attempted to take labor unions out from under
the anti-trust laws, to-wit: ".... nor shall such organizations (i.e.,
labor unions) ... be held or construed to be illegal combinations
or conspiracies in restraint of trade." Thereafter, when our Su-
preme Court was called upon in the Duplex case30 to construe the
Clayton Act in regard to labor unions it circumvented Congres-
sional intent and found that labor unions were still right where
they were prior to this Act with respect to the anti-trust laws.
Returning now to the era of a new labor law philosophy after
this sketchy history we pick up at the point when the Apex Ho-
siery case31 was before the Supreme Court. In this period of a
well remembered wave of sit-down strikes, and when only eight
of Apex's twenty-five hundred employees were union members,
the union, in order to force a closed shop contract, directed a sit-
down strike and plant seizure. The factory was taken over in its
entirety and all building locks were changed. The union people,
in addition to breaking windows and wrecking machinery, re-
fused a plea of the company for permission to remove 184,000,
dozen pairs of manufactured hosiery for which out of state orders
were outstanding.
The company, relying on previous decisions, sought recovery
of triple damages under the Sherman Act rather than avail itself
of an action for damages in the state court. In denying recovery
the court placed emphasis on "intent" as first set forth rather
artifically in the Coronado casesY.3  The court was of the opinion
that the primary objective of this violent activity was to force the
company to capitulate to the union's demand for the closed shop,
and not for the purpose of controlling the silk stocking market.
If any lingering doubts remained as to whether unions could
in any circumstances become liable under the Sherman Act they
'Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
'Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
' Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); United
Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
KCENTUCK:Y LAW JouRNAL
were dissolved by the decision in the Hutcheson case.33 We do
not quarrel with the result but the manner in which it was
reached.
By a shocking process of legalistic legerdemain the Court,
speaking through Justice Frankfurter, expressed the opinion that
Congress had in fact removed labor unions from the coverage of
the anti-trust laws, thereby casting "intent" into discard and re-
lieving the Court of the onerous duty of reversing its earlier de-
cisions, notably the Duplex case, to reach the desired result,
whereby the boycott in this case was held to be within the pro-
tective coverage of Section 20 of the Clayton Act.
The Court reached this result by finding that Sections 4 and 13
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (which had become law in 1932,
subsequent to the Danbury Hatters and Duplex decisions) rede-
fined the protected union activity set out in Section 20 of the
Clayton Act. It thereupon in effect wrote these sections back into
the Clayton Act and within its so-called catch-all phrase, "...
nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered
or held to be a violation of any law of the United States." The
dissent described this result as, "a process of construction never,
as I think, heretofore indulged in by this court."3 4 As a sole ex-
ception to the rule laid down, the Court in another case recog-
nized union liability under the Sherman Act where the combina-
tion found to be in restraint of trade was by and between the
union and an employer acting in concert.35
Having attempted to point out the preeminent position labor
had achieved under the Wagner and Norris-LaGuardia Acts,
which resulted in the protected use of jurisdictional strikes,
secondary boycotts, featherbedding and other make-work tech-
niques without let or hindrance from strictures of the injunction
or anti-trust laws, we have, so to speak, set the stage for the Taft-
Hartley Act and the changes in labor-management relations
sought to be achieved thereunder in the pursuit of that ever
elusive industrial peace.
' United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
9"Id. at 245.
" United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926).
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II. TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
A. General Scope
In considering the Taft-Hartley Act, it is perhaps well to recall
at this point that the Wagner Act, as amended, is incorporated
and becomes Title I of the Taft-Hartley Act. Further, in speaking
of labor relations law, we should make delayed mention of the
fact that we are thinking of union activity and not the broader
field of labor law which includes also child labor law, minimum
wage and hours law, veteran's reemployment preferences and
social security.
The Taft-Hartley law, as its stated policy denotes, attempts to
strike a balance between labor's and management's rights, duties
and obligations, stressing the great public interest in all such
problems.30 The full effect of the Act and its impact on labor,
management, the public interest and the national economy can-
not be known at this time. It has been in effect approximately
six years only, and has been in operation during what might be
termed a boom period of peak employment and unusual economic
circumstances. Further, as will be pointed out in more detail,
management in the interest of amicable relations, has been re-
ticent to attempt to fully enforce its rights thereunder.
It would be impossible in a limited space to examine the Act
in detail with all its provisions and implications. Too, this would
result in much speculation as much remains to be judicially con-
strued by our highest court. The Act may be set up in brief out-
line as follows:
Title I. Amending the Wagner and Norris-LaGuardia Acts
with new concepts of collective bargaining and unfair labor prac-
tices.
Title II. Creates a new mediation and conciliation service.
Title III. Provides for actions in court by and against labor
unions.
Title IV. Creates a continuing Congressional committee to
study and report on labor legislation requirements in the future.
B. Non-Communist Affidavit
Firstly, one of the Act's most publicized and controversial
" 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. sec. 141 (Supp. 1952).
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provisions, strangely enough, is that in regard to non-communist
affidavits by union officials. The section in question requires that
labor union officials place on file, with the NLBB, affidavits to the
effect that they are not members of the Communist Party or do
not believe in or support any organization that seeks to overthrow
the government of the United States by force. This provision is
given teeth by the fact that, even though the employer is guilty
of an unfair labor practice, the Board cannot hear the complaint
unless the required affidavits are on file.3
The controversial question on this provision has been whether
the AFL and CIO were "labor organizations" within the meaning
of the statute or whether it applied to officers of the union local
only. There has been some disagreement between the Board,39
its General Counsel and the courts as to whether the Act included
national officers of unions, although the wording seems clear
enough to be all inclusive, and it has been finally so held.40
One may well question the effectiveness of this section in
smoking out other than known Communists. Despite the fact
that some union offices have been proven to have been rife with
Communists or fellow travelers (in justice it must be said that
unions presently are doing a good job of house-cleaning), and
that Communism and private enterprise are direct opposites in
theory, labor has strongly urged that the section is discriminatory.
This clamor is not expected to result in a repeal of the section but
a safe prediction is that it will be amended to include manage-
ment within its scope to remove the stigma of un-Americanism
from labor as a class.*
C. Good Faith Bargaining
Previous reference has been made to the fact that under the
Wagner Act the employer who failed to bargain collectively in
good faith, as interpreted by the courts, was guilty of an unfair
,'61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. sec. 159(h) (Supp. 1952).
'Lynchburg Gas Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1948). See. 9(h) of the Labor-
Management Relations Act is constitutional. American Commn v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950).
Bethlehem Steel Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1476 (1950).
'o National Maritime Union v. Herzog, 334 U.S. 854 (1948).
* ED. NoTE: It was announced recently that among the several amendments
to the Taft-Hartley Act the present administration plans to suggest to Congress
was one which would require employers to sign the non-Communist affidavits if
union officials must do so. The Louisville Courier-Journal, sec. 1, p. 8, col. 1
(July 20, 1953).
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labor practice, and hence subject to a cease and desist order by
the Board.41 The law is still the same in this respect. Employers
are still required to bargain collectively with designated unions.
But, most significantly, the union is now under the law also re-
quired to exercise good faith in bargaining and failure to do so is
made an unfair labor practice under the Act.42 No longer may a
union official, under sanction of law, enter a collective bargaining
session and sit back with folded arms and dead-pan "make me an
offer" attitude. Careful thought will fail to reveal any legitimate
objections to the equities of such a bilateral requirement.
D. Freedom of Speech
Under our present labor relations policy, freedom of speech
is also on a bilateral basis.43 An employer under the Act may ex-
press views, arguments and opinions on unionization provided
such contain "no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
This freedom of speech granted employers seems an unnecessary
statutory guarantee of a constitutional right, but it is certainly in
accord with our democratic processes and unobjectionable if sub-
jected to the usual reasonable restraints on free speech.
In a rather recent case before the Board this statement of an
employer to his employees was cited as an unfair labor practice:
"I heard that some of our employees had joined a
union and are making it hard on employees who have not
joined a union by refusing to talk to those who have not
joined, by refusing to work properly with those employees
who have not joined and by intentionally staying away
from work. If this is true, and you employees know more
about it than I do, then it justifies my belief that a union
brings nothing but friction and unpleasantness of a kind
that runs a company out of business. I am not going to
tolerate this kind of thing. If our employees don't work the
way they ought to, then we are going to have to get rid of
them and replace them with people who are willing to work
together. If that can't be done, we'll just have to shut this
factory down and go out of business." 44
Obviously the Board was correct in-reversing the trial examiner
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F. 2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).
"61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(b)(3) (Supp. 1951).
STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(b)(3) (Supp. 1952).
"Rex Manufacturing Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 470 (1950).
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and finding that the above statement did in fact constitute a threat
of reprisal within the meaning of Section 8(c).
On the other hand, the Board found no threat of reprisal in a
letter sent all employees by their employer four days before a
representative election, advising them to ask themselves if they
wanted to continue working steadily at good rates with overtime,
or whether, by unionization, they wanted to run the chance of
strikes, lost wages and a contract that might result in no over-
time.4' The Board's ruling was that this statement contained a
recital of possible consequences of unionization rather than a
threat of what would happen from resultant employer action.
Further in this vein, the Board has ruled that characterizing a
union as "outlaw", "wildcat" or "off breed" is not a violation of
Section 8(c). 46
Such permissive speech by the employer was, prior to Taft-
Hartley, strictly taboo as an unfair labor practice. From con-
sideration of the examples given, wherein the employer presents
his views on unions, one might reasonably conclude that em-
ployer freedom of speech could result in a slowdown of union
expansion, though it possibly will not react adversely on present
union membership. In substantiation of this conclusion, it is a
matter of record that union leaders have complained, doubtless
with good reason, that Section 8(c) has resulted in a curb on the
growth of union membership, particularly in the southern states.
E. Supervisory Employees
Foremen and other supervisory personnel have always oc-
cupied something of a hybrid position in the labor movement.
Both labor and management have felt that a unionized supervisor,
with divided loyalty, represented a spy in their midst, a snake in
their bosom. In the Packard Motor Car case47 the Supreme Court
held that foremen were employees within the meaning of the
Wagner Act with the rights of self-organization and collective
bargaining incident thereto. However, Section 2(8) of the Taft-
Hartley Act amends the Wagner Act so as to specifically exclude
supervisory personnel from the category of employees.
" Cleveland Plastics, 85 N.L.R.B. 87 (1949).
" S. W. Dixon, 82 N.L.R.B. 11 (1949).
'Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
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This provision is generally regarded as a victory for manage-
ment, as the unions had begun to reverse their earlier position and
generally sought to organize supervisory workers. In any event,
it seems that the supervisors are the losers, for while they may
still organize foremen's unions, their classification as employers
deprives them of the benefits and protection of the Act.
F. Contracts
The Act has provisions on Union-Management working agree-
ments which may be classified as follows:
1. Closed Shop Contract, whereby the employer may hire
only union members and retain them only so long as they are
union members.
2. Union Shop Contract, which permits an employer to hire
whom he pleases with the proviso that the employee must join
the union within a specified period. Under the Taft-Hartley Act
the time limit is thirty days, and such contract must follow an
election wherein a majority of the employees have selected the
particular union as its designated bargaining agent.
8. Preferential Contract, in which preference is given union
members in the hiring and laying off of employees.
4. Maintenance of Membership Contract, under which one
is not required to join a union but must stay in it if he joins
(this agreement may be likened to the marriage status).
The Taft-Hartley Act has been construed to ban the Preferential
and Closed Shop Contracts, while recognizing as legal the Union
Shop and Maintenance of Membership Contracts.48
As to the affect of this provision on labor-management rela-
tions it should be noted that the Act is not retrospective and
hence, closed shop contracts entered into prior to June 28, 1947,
the effective date of the Act, are still legal and binding. Some
unions anticipated passage of the Act and were able to negotiate
long term closed shop contracts just prior thereto which are still
in force. Further, it is very probable that new closed shop con-
tracts will be negotiated, though driven under ground, so to
speak, in instances where management does not want to stand
fast for its rights. Nevertheless, this would seem to be another
provision that will in time act as a deterrent to union expansion.
' 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(a)(3) (Supp. 1952).
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This may be considered desirable or undesirable as one's interests
and beliefs may lie, but surely a public spirited unselfish union
would prefer to further its aims and seek its destiny through the
democratic union shop, where freedom of choice is a prerogative
of the individual worker.
G. Secondary Boycott
Perhaps the most far reaching provision of the Taft-Hartley
Act is the curbing of the unions' economic pressure devices by
banning of the secondary boycott by declaring such action to be
an unfair labor practice.49 The Act further empowers the Board
to petition any United States District Court for a temporary in-
junction to bring to a halt any such unfair labor practice."9
Whether given activity constitutes a proscribed secondary
boycott often presents a very troublesome question. Robert N.
Denham, Ex-General Counsel of the NLRB stated at a meeting
of the Society For Advancement of Management in San Francisco
on October 10, 1949, in part as follows:
These secondary boycotts are tricky things be-
cause what may appear to the layman to be a secondary
boycott, finally turns out, when we measure it by the lan-
guage of the law to be either a primary dispute or possibly
one that just isn't covered by the law, even though in fact
secondary.
In the current strike (February 1953) of 3,500 tugboat crew.:
men in New York harbor, pickets were ordered off the piers by a
State Supreme Court as AFL longshoremen refused to cross the
picket line. The injunction was vacated by a Brooklyn Appellate
Court, and clearly the longshoremen's action involved no second-
ary pressure.
It has been held that where a union, which was engaged in a
labor dispute with an employer, picketed the premises of a third
party or parties to force them to refrain from doing business with
the original employer, and to induce the employees of the third
parties to refuse to handle or transport shipments made by or
destined for the employer, the union was guilty of engaging
in a secondary boycott in violation of the law.'
" 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(b)(4) (Supp. 1952).
'61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. sec. 169(1) (Supp. 1952).
LeBaron v. Printing Specialties & Paper Converters Union, 75 F. Supp. 678
(S.D. Cal. 1948).
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Undoubtedly the above is an example of a true secondary boy-
cott: pressure directly applied against a neutral third party to
thereby influence the action of another with whom a labor dis-
pute exists, and within the proscription of the Act. As stated by
Mr. Denham, secondary pressure can become rather complicated
at times. However, a secondary boycott can usually be deter-
mined by ascertaining the direction of the threat or force exerted.
If directed at a neutral third party it is secondary, if directed at
the one with whom the primary dispute exists the pressure is
primary. So, concerted voluntary refusal to cross a picket line, as
in the case of the longshoremen, is primary only; and the effect
on the longshoremen's employer is incidental to the primary force.
Certainly unions have, due to the secondary boycott ban,
largely ceased what was heretofore normal activity, but it will
remain a debatable question as to whether secondary pressure is
a desirable method in obtaining union objectives. A potent union
pressure device is removed when strikes and picketing are local-
ized to the area of the primary dispute. (As an interesting side-
light, it is recalled that this refusal to patronize acquired the
name "boycott" from such practice with respect to a certain
Captain Boycott, who fell into disrepute with his customers quite
a few years past in Ireland.)
H. Injunctions and Damage Suits
The Taft-Hartley Act revives the injunction in a restricted
manner in labor relations law, though it seems clear enough that
the injunctive proceedings when instituted by action of an in-
dividual remain limited by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.52 With the
private injunction remaining illegal it may safely be said that the
Taft-Hartley Act does not reinstate private "government by in-
junction," whereby union organization and growth were ham-
strung in ex parte proceedings.
Sections 10(h), 10(j) and 10(1) of the act provide for in-
junctions in specified situations:
1. The NLRB may seek an injunction to prevent any change
in position of the parties during proceedings in a U. S. Court of
Appeals for the enforcement of an NLRB order.
' Bakery Sales Drivers' Union v. Wagshal, 883 U.S. 437 (1948).
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2. The NLRB may seek an injunction against any unfair labor
practice after an order, with respect to the complaint, has been
issued by the Board.
3. The NLRB may seek an injunction, at any time, against a
jurisdictional strike, boycott, or picketing within Sec. 8(b) (4) (d)
of the Act.
In any of the above named instances it is discretionary with the
NLRB as to whether an injunction should be sought, and the Gen-
eral Counsel has stated this power will be exercised in emergency
cases only.5 3 It is reasonable to assume that this will be a con-
tinuing policy, though the membership of the Board changes
from time to time.
In addition to the above named situations there can be cir-
cumstances under which it is mandatory that the Board go into
court and seek an injunction even before an unfair labor com-
plaint is issued; for example, where the Board has reasonable
grounds to believe that an unfair labor practice within Section
158(b) (4) (a), (b) and (c) has been committed. The Taft-
Hartley Act also authorizes injunctions in national emergency
cases and the procedure therefor is provided, wherein the Presi-
dent may act if in his opinion a strike or threatened strike imperils
the national health or safety.54
The past Truman administration was so unfriendly to the Taft-
Hartley Act that the Chief Executive refused to use this national
emergency provision and issued an executive order seizing the
steel industry under a claim of implied powers, which power was
denied by the Supreme Court.5 Irrespective of implied power in
general, it defies explanation how such could be said to exist in a
field where Congress has acted.
With the scrapping of price and wage controls by the present
administration we may reasonably predict a widespread wave of
strikes for higher wages throughout industry. A further predictioii
is that the present administration will not hesitate to use the
national emergency provision of the Act if the national health or
welfare is apparently threatened by such strikes.
Direct comment on certain salient features of the Taft-Hartley
' NLRB Release R-4, Sept. 28, 1947.
t, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. secs. 176-180 (Supp. 1952).
' Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 843 U.S. 579 (1952).
TAFT-HARTLEY AcT
Act is concluded with reference to the fact that provision is made
for damage suits by or against unions in claims arising out of the
labor-management relationship. 6
III. CONCLUSION
As was stated at the outset, the full impact of the Act on labor,
management and the public is yet to be experienced. One of the
reasons, as previously stated, is that management has been re-
luctant to insist upon all its rights. The reason for such reluctance
has been explained thusly:
"Management has grounds sufficient under the Taft-Hartley
Act to swamp our courts with requests for injunctions, suits
for violation of contract and damages, and prosecutions for
unfair labor practices, to appear as a tidal wave compared
to labor's portal-to-portal suits. Why, then, do our friends,
who are faced with featherbedding, and other unfair labor
practices specifically forbidden by the law, not go to court?
Because they do not know their rights under the law?
Hardly. The reason they are not filing briefs is due not to
ignorance or the desire to play fair so much as it is prompted
by the realization that, in the great majority of cases, the
outcome of a court suit will have little effect upon manage-
ment-labor relations in their own particular plant."57
The above quotation merely boils down to the fact that such
legislation should be used as a shield rather than as a sword by
management in the quest for industrial peace. It seems that
management generally regards the Act as being effective in
creating a desirable balance in the respective rights of labor and
management. In relation to this observation it is interesting to
note the manner in which the Act itself has affected labor rela-
tions in the opinion of management. The following are some of
the ways in which the Act has influenced management functions
as noted by the industrial relations department of a large firm: 58
1. Psychological: more collective agreements have been con-
summated without strife.
2. Employee Communications: the freedom of speech pro-
'61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. sec. 185 (Supp. 1952).
' Good, Some Effects of the Taft-Hartley Act, 1 LABOR L. J. 107, 112 (1949).
I ibid.
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vision has resulted in open discussion of union issues between em-
ployer and employees.
8. Control over Supervisors: employers may deal with super-
visory personnel on a merit basis and train them more easily.
4. Control over Labor Supply: management has some control
over employees through the union shop. It may not discriminate
in hiring or firing employees, nor is it now forced to fire employees
at the behest of a union except for non-payment of dues.
5. Control over Production: union techniques which hamper
production as boycotts, sympathy strikes, featherbedding and
jurisdictional disputes are limited or illegal.
6. Control over Suppliers and Customers: if picketing to en-
force secondary boycots is effectively enjoined, employer is free
to select his supplies and customers.
7. Collective Bargaining: genuine collective bargaining has
been resuscitated.
The policy statement of the Taft-Hartley Act is to the effect
that four major groups are involved in every labor dispute: em-
ployees, unions, employers, and the public. The statute further
states that industrial peace will come when each of these groups
recognizes the legitimate rights of the others, and when the first
three accept the fact that the public interest prevails over all.
From the provisions of this broad labor relations act our pres-
ent national labor policy may be summarized in terms of the fol-
lowing ends and means:
1. Industrial peace: continued production, uninterrupted by
strikes and lockouts.
2. Collective bargaining: the settlement of industrial disputes
through peaceable negotiations by both employer and employee
in the exercise of good faith.
3. Self-organization of employees: free from interference of
employer, and by employee in the erercise of good faith.
4. Discontinuance of certain labor activities: secondary strikes
and boycotts, jurisdictional disputes and featherbedding are eco-
nomically undesirable.
5. Every effort, short of compulsory arbitration must be util-
ized to prevent, postpone or settle strikes that imperil the national
health or safety.
If the national labor policy as summarized, and the formula
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for industrial peace as stated are accepted as sound, then it would
seem to follow that the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 should be acceptable as a noteworthy contribution toward
achievement of those ends.
Perhaps industrial peace is entirely possible if labor and man-
agement will take the position that both are here to stay, that
they are mutually essential and that each is equally dependent
upon the other. Labor must define its objectives in view of the
fact that labor and capital cannot become fused without private
enterprise coming to an end.
Capital must recognize that labor regards the union as a
powerful common bond and as a personal instrument of self-ful-
fiHment. Capital must know that the union is a bread and butter
proposition and more. Unionization must be recognized as not
only a movement but also a political instrumentality that reaches
beyond bare workshop economy to state and national politics,
with matters of social engineering and foreign relations coming
within the legitimate purview of the unions.
Perhaps it was inevitable that capital in an expanding age
would reach an undesirable ascendency, as it did. Union leaders'
determined effort in throwing off this yoke of inequality en-
gendered bitterness that is hard to dissipate. It was just as in-
evitable that the pendulum would swing back in time to curb ir-
responsible unions. Now that unions have come of age we can
expect to see them bargain without an inferiority complex. This
may hold out hope for the future.
If America is to point the way in the present-day world's
economy, and demonstrate that private capital and labor can co-
exist, opinions that once labelled unions as common law con-
spiracies must be accepted as no more absurd than this language
quoted from an opinion by the Criminal Court of Appeals of
Oklahoma:
Labor is natural; capital is artificial. Labor was
made by God; capital is made by man. Labor is not only
blood and bone but it also has a mind and soul, and is
animated by sympathy, hope and love; capital is inanimate
soulless matter. Labor is the creator; capital is the creature.
Labor is always a matter of necessity. Capital
is largely a matter of luxury. Labor has been dignified by
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the example of Cod. The Saviour of mankind was called
the 'carpenter's son'. We are told in the bible that "the love
of money is the root of all evil." This statement is con-
finned by the entire history of the human race. The love of
money is the cause of the organization of trusts and mo-
nopolies. With what show of reason and justice, therefore,
can the advocates of monopoly be heard to say that capital
is the equal of labor 9
The judge of the Oklahoma Court, supra, who wrote of the
"soulless" nature of capital displayed either consummate ignor-
ance or supreme bias that caused disregard of the facts. His
Honor overlooked the individual American who invests his sav-
ings in corporate stock to let business experts manage his assets
at an overall average return of 6.7% on the investment. He over-
looked the small business men who have, through toil and self-
sacrifice, accumulated capital and pooled their assets to make
this country strong in spirit, high in standards of living and
leaders in technological know-how. And, perhaps, he was not
apprised of the fact that the "soulless" capital of the United
States Steel Corporation is owned by more than a quarter of a
million Americans; General Motors' Corporation is owned by over
one-half a million stockholders; or that a short while ago a man
and his wife, residents of an average American town in Michigan,
purchased seven shares of stock in American Telephone and Tele-
graph, thus becoming its millionth shareholder. Stock ownership
in private corporations is not a special privilege of the few, but
rather, one of the most democratic privileges existing in our
democracy. Only so long as this privilege remains with us will we
remain free people. The alternative is filling of state imposed
quotas and taxation that support government owned corporations
without private participation in management or profits.
If our system of free enterprise under a capitalistic and demo-
cratic state is to be maintained, the continuing task of Congress
will be to give both labor and management a maximum of free-
dom with a minimum of governmental regulation consistent with
the national welfare. We can never completely submerge natural;
fundamental self-interest, but if labor and management will bar-
gain, and legislative bodies will legislate, whilst motivated with
the knowledge that capital represents fifteen million individual
State v. Coyle, 8 Okla. Cr. 686, 130 Pao. 316 (1913).
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shareholder-partners, and that organized labor represents sixteen
million individual workers, then perhaps a spirit of "live and let
live" will eventually bring comparative industrial peace to a
troubled area for the common good.
As to the future of the Taft-Hartley Act, it would be unsafe
to predict beyond the near future, possibly encompassing the
present administration, in view of changing political fortunes,
and domestic economy as controlled by unsettled world condi-
tions. It is reasonably certain that unless representatives of labor
and management can find a common basis for revision of the
Taft-Hartley Act it will undergo no major surgery this year. This
statement must be qualified by referring to what may well be the
most important factor influencing Congress on labor legislation,
i.e., what will happen between the big unions and big corpora-
tions in the next few months now that most price and wage con-
trols are gone.
Business will fight to keep the gains it has made, while labor,
having abandoned hopes of outright repeal of Taft-Hartley,
will apparently seek the same ends through announced political
action programs that amount to piecemeal repeal.
The Executive Board of the CIO has recently in the interests
of "justice and fairness" called for seven basic changes in the Taft-
Hartley Act:
1. Elimination of injunction provisions, including the pro-
vision whereby injunctions may be obtained to delay national
emergency strikes.
2. Removal of the ban against the closed shop.
3. Dropping of provisions which hamper unions from striking,
picketing, and refusing to handle struck work.
4. Elimination of provisions making unions liable in damage
actions for unfair practices.
5. Simplification of language and removal of technicalities
with respect to union officers' filing non-Communist oaths and
reports on union activity or finances.
6. Removal of certain provisions alleged to benefit the craft
unions at the expense of the industrial unions (a craft union is
composed of workers with similar skills, while industrial unions
take in all types of workers in a plant or industry).
7. Elimination of employers' right to air their views on
unionism.
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This "just and fair" program would put labor back in the
halcyon days of "anything goes," of indiscriminate strikes and
boycotts, full control over labor supplies, a silenced management
and wrecking crews operating without fear of civil liability. Such
a situation is just as antagonistic to democracy as is "government
by injunction" in the days of imported strike breaking thugs.
Experience teaches us that industry-wide strikes can, espe-
cially during a national emergency, actually imperil the public
health and safety. On the labor side of the picture, however, is
the fact that the strike is labor's most potent economic pressure
device. It goes without saying then that labor will militantly re-
sist any and all attempts to further restrict the right to strike, now
secured to it by positive law.60 At a time when this country was
engaged in all-out war and crippling labor strikes loomed threat-
eningly there was strong public sentiment for such strike legisla
tion which did not crystallize into congressional action. It follows
that, in the face of union opposition coupled with comparative
peace on the labor front, should the bill to ban industry-wide
bargaining receive favorable committee action, which is unlikely,
it would most likely meet defeat on the floors of Congress.
The unions have also condemned certain "innocuous pro-
cedural changes." These are described as mincing steps forward
to camouflage steady strides backward. Such criticism would
seem justified with respect to such measures as a proposed in-
crease of the NLRB members to seven in number unless on a
basis of case load. Certainly any change in Board membership
that will aid in disposing of unfair practice complaints in a more
expeditious manner and under an established policy of precedent
upon which labor and management can rely is to be desired. It is
an inescapable fact that the Board to function equitably must be
staffed irrespective of political affinity.
We can conclude speculation on what lies ahead for the Taft-
Hartley Act with the assurance that, with the National Association
of Manufacturers marshalling forces to offset labor pressure on
Congress, committee hearings and inevitable congressional de-
bate, the months ahead will not lack for lively action for parties
in interest.
' 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. sec. 163 (Supp. 1952).
